Aristotle: Biology

aristotleAristotle (384-322 B.C.Due east.) may be said to be the commencement biologist in the Western tradition. Though there are physicians and other natural philosophers who remark on various flora and fauna earlier Aristotle, none of them brings to his study a systematic critical empiricism. Aristotle's biological scientific discipline is of import to empathise, non only because information technology gives u.s.a. a view into the history and philosophy of science, only likewise because information technology allows united states more deeply to understand his not-biological works, since certain cardinal concepts from Aristotle's biology repeat themselves in his other writings. Since a significant portion of the corpus of Aristotle's piece of work is on biological science, it is natural to expect his work in biology to resonate in his other writings. I may, for example, use concepts from the biological works to ameliorate empathise the ideals or metaphysics of Aristotle.

This article volition begin with a brief explanation of his biological views and motion toward several key explanatory concepts that Aristotle employs. These concepts are essential considering they stand every bit candidates for a philosophy of biology. If Aristotle's principles are insightful, so he has gone a long way towards creating the commencement systematic and critical system of biological thought. It is for this reason (rather than the particular observations themselves) that moderns are interested in Aristotle's biological writings.

Table of Contents

  1. His Life
  2. The Telescopic of Aristotle's Biological Works
  3. The Specialist and the Generalist
  4. The Ii Modes of Causal Caption
  5. Aristotle'south Theory of Soul
  6. The Biological Practice: Outlines of a Systematics
  7. "The more than and the less" and "Epi to polu"
  8. Pregnant Achievements and Mistakes
  9. Conclusion
  10. References and Further Reading
    1. Main Text
    2. Key Texts in Translation
    3. Selected Secondary Sources

ane. His Life

Aristotle was born in the twelvemonth 384 B.C. in the town of Stagira (the modern boondocks Stavros), a coastal Macedonian town to the north of Greece. He was raised at the courtroom of Amyntas where he probably met and was friends with Philip (later to become king and father to Alexander, the Neat). When Aristotle was effectually 18, he was sent to Athens to study in Plato's Academy. Aristotle spent twenty years at the Academy until Plato's death, although Diogenes says Aristotle left before Plato's death. When Plato was succeeded by his nephew, Speusippus, equally head of the Academy, Aristotle accepted an invitation to join a erstwhile student, Hermeias, who was gathering a Platonic circle nearly him in Assos in Mysia (near Troy). Aristotle spent three years in this environment. During this time, he may have done some of the natural investigations that later becameThe History of Animals.

At the stop of Aristotle'due south stay in Mysia, he moved to Lesbos (an side by side isle). This move may have been prompted by Theophrastus, a swain of the Academy who was much influenced by Aristotle. It is probable (according to D'Arcy Thompson) that Aristotle performed some important biological investigations during this menstruation.

Aristotle returned to Athens (circa 334-5). This began a flow of slap-up productivity. He rented some grounds in woods sacred to Apollo. Information technology was here that Aristotle fix-upwards his schoolhouse (Diog. Laert V, 51).

At his school Aristotle also accumulated a large number of manuscripts and created a library that was a model for later libraries in Alexandria and Pergamon. According to one tradition, Alexander (his old pupil) paid him a handsome sum of money each yr every bit a form of gratitude (besides as some exotic animals for Aristotle to study that Alexander encountered in his conquests).

At the expiry of Alexander in 323, Athens again was total of anti-Macedonian sentiment. A charge of impiety was brought against Aristotle due to a verse form he had written for Hermeias. One martyr for philosophy (Socrates) was plenty for Aristotle and so he left his school to his colleague, Theophrastus, and fled to the Macedonian Chalcis. Here in 322 he died of a disease that is all the same the bailiwick of speculation.

ii. The Scope of Aristotle's Biological Works

At that place is some dispute as to which works should exist classified as the biological works of Aristotle. This is indeed a contentious question that is peculiarly difficult for a systematic philosopher such every bit Aristotle. Generally speaking, a systematic philosopher is one who constructs various philosophical distinctions that, in turn, tin be applied to a number of unlike contexts. Thus, a distinction such equally "the more and the less" that has its roots in biology explaining that certain animal parts are greater (bigger) among some individuals and smaller amidst others, can as well be used in the ideals as a cornerstone of the doctrine of the mean as a criterion for virtue. That is, one varies from the mean by the principle of the more and the less. For case, if backbone is the hateful, and then the defect of excess would exist "foolhardiness" while the defect of paucity would be "cowardice." The boundary betwixt what we'd consider "biology" proper vs. what nosotros'd think of as psychology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics is frequently hard to draw in Aristotle. That'southward considering Aristotle'southward understanding of biology informs his metaphysics and philosophy of listen, only likewise, he often uses the distinctions drawn in his metaphysics in society to deal with biological issues.

In this article, the biological works are: (a) works that bargain specifically with biological topics such as:The Parts of Animals (PA), The Generation of Animals (GA), The History of Animals (HA), The Movement of Animals, The Progression of Animals, On Sense and Sensible Objects, On Retention and Recollection, On Sleep and Waking, On Dreams, On Prophecy in Sleep, On Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, On Respiration, On Jiff, andOn Plants, and (b) the work that deals withpsuche (soul),On the Soul—though this work deals with metaphysical problems very explicitly, as well. This listing does not include works such as theMetaphysics, Physics, Posterior Analytics, Categories, Nicomachean Ethics, orThe Politics fifty-fifty though they incorporate many arguments that are augmented past an agreement of Aristotle's biological science. Nor does this article examine any of the reputedly lost works (listed by ancient authors simply non existing today) such asDissections, On Composite Animals, On Sterility, On Physiognomy, andOn Medicine . Some of these titles may have sections that have survived in part within the present corpus, merely this is doubtful.

iii. The Specialist and the Generalist

The stardom between the specialist and the generalist is a good starting betoken for agreement Aristotle'southward philosophy of biology. The specialist is 1 who has a considerable trunk of experience in practical fieldwork while the generalist is i who knows many dissimilar areas of study. This stardom is brought out in Volume 1 of theParts of Animals (PA). At PA 639a i-7 Aristotle says,

In all study and investigation, exist information technology exalted or mundane, there appear to exist two types of proficiency: ane is that of exact, scientific noesis while the other is a generalist'southward understanding. (my tr.)

Aristotle does not mean to denigrate or to exalt either. Both are necessary for natural investigations. The generalist's understanding is holistic and puts some area of study into a proper genus, while scientific knowledge deals with causes and definitions at the level of the species. These two skills are demonstrated past the following example:

An case of what I hateful is the question of whether ane should take a single species and state its differentia independently, for example,man sapiens nature or the nature of Lions or Oxen, etc., or should we first prepare down common attributes or a mutual character (PA 639a 15-19, my tr.).

In other words, the methodology of the specialist would exist to detect and catalogue each separate species by itself. The generalist, on the other hand, is drawn to making more global connections through an understanding of the mutual graphic symbol of many species. Both skills are needed. Here and elsewhere Aristotle demonstrates the limitations of a single mode of discovery. We cannot just ready out a single path toward scientific investigation—whether information technology be demonstrative (logical) exactness (the specialist'due south agreement) or holistic agreement (the generalist'south cognition). Neither direction (specialist or generalist) is the ane and only mode to truth. Really, information technology is a footling of both working in tandem. Sometimes one one-half takes the lead and sometimes the other. The adoption of several methods is a cornerstone of Aristotelian pluralism, a methodological principle that characterizes much of his work.

When discussing biological science, Aristotle presents the reader 2 directions: (a) the modes of discovery (genetic guild) and (b) the presentation of a completed science (logical order). In the mode of discovery, the specialist sets out all the phenomena in as much detail as possible while the generalist must use her inter-generic knowledge to sort out what may or may non exist significant in the event taking place before her. This is because in the mode of discovery, the investigator is in the genetic guild. Some possible errors that could be made in this order (for instance) might be mistaking certain beast behaviors for an end for which they were not intended. For example, it is very easy to fault mating behavior for aggressive territorial behavior. Since the generalist has seen many different types of animals, she may be in the all-time position (on the basis of generic analogy) to allocate the sort of beliefs in question.

In the way of discovery 1 begins with the phenomenon and then seeks to create a causal caption (PA 646a 25). Simply how does i become about doing this? In thePosterior Analytics Two.nineteen, Aristotle suggests a process of induction that begins with the particular and and so moves to the universal. Arriving at the universal entails a comprehensive agreement of some phenomenon. For instance, if ane wanted to know whether fish sleep, one would start observe fish in their environment. If ane of the behaviors of the fish meets the common understanding of slumber (such as beingness muffled to outside stimulus, showing petty to no movement, and and so forth), so one may movement to the generalization that fish sleep (On Sleeping and Waking 455b 8, cf.On Dreams 458b 9). Merely one cannot stop there. Once one has determined that fish slumber (via the inductive mode of discovery), it is now upwardly to the researcher to ferret out the causes and reasons why, in a systematic fashion. This 2nd step is the mode of presentation. In this manner the practitioner of biological scientific discipline seeks to understand why the universal is as it is. Going back to the example of sleeping fish, the scientist would enquire why fish need to sleep. Is it past analogy to humans and other animals that seem to gather force through sleep? What ways might sleep exist unsafe (say by opening the individual fish to being eaten)? What do fish practise to avert this?

These, and other questions crave the practitioner to work back and forth with what has been fix downwards in the mode of discovery for the purpose of providing an explanation. The virtually important tools for this exercise are the two modes of causal explanation.

4. The Ii Modes of Causal Explanation

For Aristotle there are four causes: cloth, efficient, formal, and last. The material cause is characterized every bit "That out of which something existing becomes" (Phys. 194b 24). The material has the potential for the range of last products. Inside the cloth is, in a potential sense, that which is to be formed. Obviously, one piece of wood or metal has the potential to be many artifacts; yet the possibilities are not infinite. The material itself puts constraint upon what can be produced from information technology. One can execute designs in glass, for example, which could never be brought forth from brass.

The efficient cause is depicted as "that from whence comes the first principle of kinetic change or balance" (Phys. 194b xxx). Aristotle gives the example of a male fathering a child as showing an efficient cause. The efficient cause is the trigger that starts a process moving.

The formal cause constitutes the essence of something while the final crusade is the purpose of something. For example, Aristotle believed the tongue to be for the purpose of either talking or not. If the tongue was for the purpose of talking (final cause), then it had to be shaped in a certain manner, wide and supple so that it might course subtle differences in sound (formal crusade). In this fashion the purpose of the tongue for speaking dovetails with the structural way it might exist brought about (P.A. 660a 27-32).

It is generally the case that Aristotle in his biological science interrelates the last and formal causes. For example Aristotle says that the efficient crusade may exist inadequate to explain modify. In the On Generation and Corruption 336a Aristotle states that all natural efficient causes are regulated by formal causes. "It is clear then that burn itself acts and is acted upon." What this means is that while the fire does act as efficient cause, themanner of this activeness is regulated by a formal/last cause. The formal cause (via the doctrine of natural place—that arranges an ascending hierarchy amongst the elements, earth, h2o, air and fire) dictates that fire is the highest level of the sub-lunar phenomena. Thus, its essence defines its purpose, namely, to travel upward toward its own natural place. In this mode the formal and final cause human action together to guide the deportment of fire (efficient cause) to bespeak upward toward its natural identify.

Aristotle (at least in the biological works) invokes a strategy of redundant caption. Taken at its simplest level, he gives four accounts of everything. However, in the actual exercise, it comes about that he actually only offers two accounts. In the starting time business relationship he presents a instance for understanding an event via material/kinetic ways. For the sake of simplicity, let us telephone call this the ME (materially-based causal explanation) account.

In the second case he presents aspects of essence (formal cause) and purpose (final cause). These are presented together. For the sake of simplicity, let us call this the TE (teleologically-based causal caption) account. For an example of how these work together, consider respiration.

Aristotle believes that material and efficient causes can give ane business relationship of the motions of the air in and out of the lungs for respiration. But this is just part of the story. One must also consider the purpose of respiration and how this essence affects the entire organism (PA 642a 31-642b four). Thus the combination of the efficient and cloth causes are lumped together every bit one sort of explanation ME that focus upon how the nature of hot and cold air form a sort of current that brings in new air and exhales the sometime. The concluding and formal causes are linked together equally another sort of explanation TE that is tied to why nosotros take respiration in the first place.

In Aristotle's business relationship respiration we are presented with a partner to TE and ME: necessity. When necessity attaches itself to ME it is called simple or absolute necessity. When necessity attaches itself to TE it is called conditional necessity. Let us return to our case of respiration and examine these concepts in more than detail.

First, then there is the formal/final cause of respiration. Respiration exists so that air might be brought into the body for the cosmos ofpneuma (a vital force essential for life). If there were no respiration, there would exist no intake of air and no way for it to be heated in the region of the center and turned intopneuma—an chemical element necessary for life among the blooded animals who live out of water. Thus the TE for respiration is for the sake of producing an essential raw material for the cosmos ofpneuma.

The 2d mode of explanation, ME, concerns the material and efficient causes related to respiration. These have to do with the manner of a quasi-gas law theory. The hot air in the lungs will tend to stay in that location unless it is pushed out by the cold incoming air that hurries its exit (cf.On Breath 481b 11). (This is because 'hot' and 'cold' are two of the essential contraries hot/cold & moisture/dry out). It is the material natures of the elements that dictate its motions. This is the realm of the ME.

ME is an of import mode of explanation because information technology grounds the practitioner in the empirical facts and so that he may not incline himself to offer merea priori causal accounts. When one is forced to give cloth and kinetic accounts of some upshot, then one is grounded in the tangible dynamics of what is happening. This is one important requirement for knowledge.

Now to necessity. Necessity tin can be represented as a modal operator that can attach itself to either TE or to ME. When information technology attaches itself to TE, the result is conditional necessity. In conditional necessity one must always begin with the end to be accomplished. For example, if 1 assumes the teleological assumption of natural efficiency, Nature does cipher in vain (GA 741b 5, cf. 739b20, et. al.) and then the functions of diverse animal parts must be viewed within that frame. If we know that respiration is necessary for life, so what beast parts are necessary to allow respiration inside different species? The credence of the end of respiration causes the investigator to account for how it tin can occur within a species. The same could exist said for other given ends such as "gaining nutrition," "defending one'due south self from attack," and "reproduction," among others. When the biologist begins his investigation with some end (whether in the way of discovery or the manner of scientific presentation), he is creating an account of conditional necessity.

The other sort of necessity is absolute necessity that is the result of matter following its nature (such as burn down moving to its natural identify). The very nature of the cloth, itself, creates the dynamics—such as the quasi gas law interactions betwixt the hot and cold air in the lungs. These dynamics may be described without proximate reference to the purpose of the event. In this way ME can function by itself along with unproblematic necessity to requite one complete account of an event.

In biological science Aristotle believes that conditional necessity is the most useful of the two necessities in discovery and explanation (PA 639b 25). This is because, in biology, in that location is a sense that the unabridged caption always requires the purpose to set out the boundaries of what is and what is not pregnant. However, in his practise information technology is most often the example that Aristotle employs 2 complete accounts ME and TE in order to reveal unlike modes of caption according to his doctrine of pluralism.

5. Aristotle's Theory of Soul

The word for 'soul' in Aristotle ispsuche. In Latin information technology is translated asanima. For many readers, information technology is the use of the Latin term (peculiarly as it was used by Christian, Moslem, and Jewish theologians) that forms the basis of our modern understanding of the word. Nether the theological tradition, the soul meant an immaterial, discrete ruling power within a man. It was immortal and went to God subsequently death. This tradition gave rise to Descartes' metaphysical dualism: the doctrine that there are two sorts of things that exist (soul and thing), and that soul ruled matter.

Aristotle does not recollect of soul as the aforementioned theologians practice. This is because thing (hyle) and shape (morphe) combine to create a unity non a duality. The philosopher tin can intellectually abstract out the separate constituents, just in reality they are always united. This unity is often termed hylomorphism (afterwards its root words). Using the terminology of the final section nosotros can identifyhyle with ME andmorphe with TE. Thus, Aristotle'due south doctrine of the soul (understood every bit hylomorphism) represents a unity of form and function within thing.

From the biological perspective, soul demarcates 3 sorts of living things: plants, animals, and homo beings. In this manner soul acts every bit the cause of a torso's being alive (De An 415b 8). This amalgamation (soul and trunk) exhibits itself through the presentation of a particular power that characterizes what information technology means to be alive for that sort of living thing.

The soul is the form of a living trunk thus constituting its first authenticity. Together the body and soul class an amalgamation. This is considering when we clarify the whole into its component parts the particular ability of the amalgamation is lost. Matter without TE, as we accept seen, acts through the nature of its elements (earth, air, burn down, and water) and non for its organic purpose. An instance that illustrates the relationship betwixt class and matter is the human eye. When an eye is situated in a living body, the matter (and the motions of that matter) of the eye works with the other parts of the torso to present the actualization of a detail power: sight. When governed by the actuality (or fulfillment) of its purpose, an eyeball can run across (De An 412b 17). Both the matter of the eyeball and its various neural connections (hyle, understood as ME) along with the formal and last causes (morphe, understood every bit TE) are necessary for sight. Each part has its particular purpose, and that purpose is given through its contribution to the basic tasks associated with essence of the sort of thing in question: found, animate being, homo.

It is important non to skid into the theological cum Cartesian sense ofanima here. To say that plants and animals take souls is not to affirm that there is a Divine rose garden or hound Sky. We must call up that soul for Aristotle is a hylomorphic unity representing a monism and not a dualism. (The rational soul'southward condition is less clear since information technology is situated in no particular organ since Aristotle rejected the brain as the organ of thinking relegating it to a cooling mechanism, PA652b 21-25). It is the dynamic, vital organizing principle of life—nothing more than, nothing less.

Plants exhibit the most bones power that living organisms possess: nutrition and reproduction (De An 414a 31). The purpose of a plant is to take in and process materials in such a way that the plant grows. Several consequences follow (for the near role) from an individual establish having a well-operating nutritive soul. Let'south examine i sort of plant, a tree. If a establish exhibits excellence in taking in and processing diet it will showroom various positive furnishings. First, the tree will have tallness and girth that will encounter it through different weather condition conditions. Second, it will alive longer. 3rd, it volition drib lots of seeds giving rise to other trees. Thus, if we were to compare two private copse (of the same species), and one was tall and robust while the other was small and thin, then nosotros would be able to return a judgment about the 2 individual trees on the basis of their fulfillment of their purpose as plants within that species. The tall and robust tree of that species would be a meliorate tree (functionally). The pocket-size and thin tree would exist condemned equally failing to fulfill its purpose as a institute within that species.

Animals contain the nutritive soul plus some of the following powers: ambition, sensation, and locomotion (De An 414a 30, 414b 1-415a 13). At present, not all animals have withal powers. For example, some (like dogs) take a adult sense of smell, while others (like cats) have a adult ability to run quickly with residual. This makes elementary comparisons between species more hard, but inside ane species the same sort of analysis used with plants also holds. That is, between 2 individual dogs 1 canis familiaris tin (for instance) smell his prey up to 200 meters away while the other dog tin can just discover his prey up to 50 meters. (This assumes that being able to detect prey from a distance allows the individual to eat more than often.) The first dog is better because he has fulfilled his soul's part better than the 2d. The starting time canis familiaris is thus a proficient dog while the second a bad example of one. What is important here is that animals judged as animals must fulfill that power (soul) item to it specifically in order to be functionally excellent. This means that dogs (for example) are proximately judged on their olfactory sense and remotely upon their power to accept in nutrition and to reproduce.

Humans contain the nutritive soul and the appetitive-sensory-locomotive souls along with the rational soul. This ability is given in a passive, active, and imaginative sense (De An Three 3-5). What this means is that offset in that location is a power in the rational soul to perceive sensation and to process it in such a fashion that it is intelligible. Next, one is able to use the data received in the first step as fabric for analysis and reflection. This involves the agile agency of the heed. Finally, the result (having both a sensory and ratiocinative element) tin can be arranged in a novel manner so that the universal mixes with the perceived detail. This is imagination (De An Three.iii). For example, one might perceive in step-one that your door is hanging at a slant. In step-two y'all examine the hinges and ponder why the door is hanging in just this manner. Finally, in step-three you consider types of solutions that might solve the problem—such as taking a plane to the pinnacle of the door, or inserting a "shim" backside one of the hinges. You make your decision aboutthis door in front of you based upon your assessment of the diverse generic solutions.

The rational soul, thus understood equally a multi-stride imaginative process, gives rise to theoretical and practical cognition that, in turn, have other sub-divisions (EN Half dozen). Just as the unmarried nutritive soul of plants was greatly complicated by the addition of souls for the animals, so also is the situation even more than complicated with the add-on of the rational soul for humans. This is because it has and then many dissimilar applications. For instance, ane person may know right and wrong and can act on this noesis and create habits of the same while another may have productive knowledge of an creative person who is able to master the functional requirements of his craft in social club to produce well-wrought artifacts. Just as it is hard to compare cats and dogs amongst animal souls, and so it is difficult to judge diverse instantiations of excellence amongst man rational souls. Even so, it is clear that between 2 persons compared on their ethical virtues and two artists compared on their productive wisdom, we may make intra-category judgments about each. These sorts of judgments begin with a biological understanding of what it ways to exist a human beingness and how one may fulfill her biological function based on her possession of the human rational soul (understood in ane of the sub-categories of reason). Once again, a biological understanding of the soul has implications beyond the field of biology/psychology.

6. The Biological Practice: Outlines of a Systematics

Systematics is the study of how i ought to create a system of biological classification and thus perform taxonomy. ("Systematics" is not to be confused with existence a "systematic philosopher." The former term has a technical meaning related to the theoretical foundations of beast nomenclature and taxonomy. The latter phrase has to do with a tightly structured interlocking philosophical account.) In Aristotle'south logical works, he creates a theory of definition. According to Aristotle, the best way to create a definition is to find the proximate group in which the type of thing resides. For example, humans are a type of affair (species) and their proximate grouping is animal (or blooded animal). The proximate grouping is called thegenus. Thus the genus is a larger grouping of which the species is merely one proper subset. What marks off that particular species as unique? This is thedifferentia or the essential defining trait. In our case with humans the differentia is "rationality." Thus the definition of "human" is a rational animal. "Human" is the species, "animal" is the genus and "rationality" is the differentia.

In a like way, Aristotle adapts his logical theory of genus and species to biological science. By thinking in terms of species and their proximate genus, Aristotle makes a statement about the connections between various types of animals. Aristotle does not create a full-blown classification system that can describe all animals, only he does lay the theoretical foundations for such.

The first overarching categories are the blooded and the not-blooded animals. The animals covered by this distinction roughly correspond to the modern stardom between vertebrates and invertebrates. There are also two classes of dualizers that are animals that fit somewhat between categories. Here is a sketch of the categorization:

I. Blooded Animals

A. Live bearing animals

1. Homo Sapiens2. Other mammals without a stardom for primates

B. Egg-laying animals

1. Birds2. Fish

I. Non-Blooded Animals

A. Beat out skinned sea animals: testaceaB. Soft shelled ocean animals: Crustacea

C. Non-shelled soft skinned sea animals: Cephalopods

D. Insects

Due east. Bees

I. Dualizers (animals that share properties of more i grouping)

A. Whales, seals and porpoises—they requite alive birth notwithstanding they live in the seaB. Bats—they accept 4 appendages yet they fly

C. Sponges—they act like both plants and similar animals

Aristotle's proto-organisation of classification differs from that of his predecessors who used habitat and other non-functional criteria to classify animals. For instance, one theory commonly set out three large groups: air, land, and sea creatures. Because of the functional orientation of Aristotle's TE, Aristotle repudiates any classification system based upon non-functional accidents. What is important is that the primary activities of life are carried out efficiently through especially designated body parts.

Though Aristotle'south piece of work on classification is past no means comprehensive (but is rather a serial of reflections on how to create one), it is appropriate to describe it as meta-systematics. Such reflections are consistent with his other key explanatory concepts of functionalism (TE and ME) too as his work on logic in theOrganon with respect to the utilization of genus and species. Though incomplete, this once more is a blueprint of how to construct a systematics. The general structure of meta-systematics as well acts as an independent principle that permits Aristotle to examine animals together that are functionally similar. Such a move enhances the reliability of analogy as a tool of explanation.

seven. "The more and the less" and "Epi to polu"

"The more and the less" is an explanatory concept that is centrolineal to the ME business relationship. Principally, information technology is a manner that individuation occurs in the non-uniform parts. Aristotle distinguishes ii sorts of parts in animals: the compatible and the non-uniform. The compatible parts are those that if you dumped them into a saucepan and cutting the bucket in half, they would still remain the same. For example, claret is a uniform part. Dump blood into a bucket and cutting it in one-half and it'southward even so the same blood (merely half the quantity). The same is true of tissue, cartilage, tendons, skin, et al. Non-uniform parts alter when the bucket examination is applied. If you dump a lung into a bucket and cut it in half, you no longer have a proper organ. The same holds truthful of other organs: heart, liver, pancreas, and and so forth, equally well as the skeleton (Uniform Parts—PA 646b 20, 648b, 650a 20, 650b, 651b 20, 652a 23; Non-Uniform Parts—PA 656b 25, 622a 17, 665b twenty, 683a xx, 684a 25.)

When an individual has excess nutrition (trophe), the excess (perittoma) oftentimes is distributed all around (GA 734b 25). An external observer does non perceive the changes to the uniform parts—except, maybe, tummy fat. But such an observer would perceive the divergence in a child who has been well fed (whose non-compatible parts are bigger) than 1 who hasn't. The difference is accounted for by the principle of the more and the less.

How does an external observer differentiate between any two people? The reply is that the non-uniform parts (particularly the skeletal structure) differ. Thus, ane person'south nose is longer, another stands taller, a 3rd is broader in the shoulders, etc. We all have noses, stand within a range of height and broadness of shoulders, etc. The item mix that nosotros each possess makes us individuals.

Sometimes, this mix goes beyond the range of the species (eidos). In these instances a part becomes not-functional because it has too much material or too little. Such situations are beyond the natural range one might expect within the species. Because of this, the instance involved is characterized as being unnatural (para phusin).

The possibility of unnatural events occurring in nature affects the status of explanatory principles in biology. We remember from to a higher place that there are ii sorts of necessity: provisional and absolute. The absolute necessity never fails. Information technology is the sort of necessity that i tin can apply to the stars that exist in the super lunar realm. One tin can create star charts of the heavens that will be accurate for a thousand years frontwards or backward. This is considering of the mode of absolute necessity.

Even so, because provisional necessity depends upon its telos, and because of the principle of the more and the less that is not-teleologically (ME) driven, there can arise a sort of spontaneity (cf.automaton, Phys. Ii.6) that tin can alter the normal, expected execution of a task considering spontaneity is purposeless. In these cases the input from the cloth cause is greater or lesser than is unremarkably the case. The upshot is an unnatural outcome based upon the principle of the more and the less. An case of this might be obesity. Nourishment is delivered to the body in a hierarchical fashion offset with the principal needs. When all biological needs are met, then the excess goes into hair, nails and body fat. Excess trunk fat can impair proper office, but non out of blueprint.

Because of the possibility of spontaneity and its unintended consequences, the necessary operative in biological events (conditional necessity) is just "for the nigh part" (hôs epi to polu). We cannot await biological explanatory principles to be of the same club every bit those of the stars.Ceteris paribis principles are the best the biological realm can give. This creature fact gives rising to a unlike set of epistemic expectations than are often raised in thePrior Analytics and thePosterior Analytics. Our expectations for biological science are for full general rules that are true in most cases but take many exceptions. This means that biology cannot be an exact scientific discipline, unlike astronomy. If there are e'er going to be exceptions that are contrary to nature, then the biologist must do his biology with toleration for these sorts of peripheral anomalies. This disposition is characterized past the doctrine ofepi to polu.

eight. Significant Achievements and Mistakes

This section will highlight a few of Aristotle's biological achievements from the perspective of over two,300 years of hindsight. For simplicity'south sake permit us break these upwardly into "bad calls" (observations and conclusions that have proven to be wrong) and "good calls" (observations and conclusions that have proven to exist very accurate).

We begin with the bad calls: let'due south starting time with a few of Aristotle's mistakes. First, Aristotle believed that thinking occurred in the region around the centre and not in the brain (a cooling organ, PA 652b 21-25, cf. HA 514a 16-22). 2nd, Aristotle thought that men were hotter than women (the opposite is the example). Third, Aristotle overweighed the male contribution in reproduction. Quaternary, footling details are ofttimes amiss such every bit the number of teeth in women. Fifth, Aristotle believed that spontaneous generation could occur. For example, Aristotle observed that from animal dung certain flies could appear (even though careful observation did non reveal any flies mating and laying their eggs in the dung. The possibility of the eggs already existing in the abdomen of the animal did not occur to Aristotle.) However, these sorts of mistakes are more than oft than non the consequence of ana priori principle such as "women beingness colder and less perfectly formed than men" or the application of his method on (in principle) unobservables—such as human being formulation in which it is posited that the male provides the efficient, formal, and final crusade while the woman provides simply the material cause.

Proficient Calls: Aristotle examined over 500 different species of animals. Some species came from fishermen, hunters, farmers, and perhaps Alexander. Many other species were viewed in nature by Aristotle. There are some very exact observations fabricated by Aristotle during his stay at Lesbos. It is virtually certain that his early autopsy skills were utilized solely upon animals (due to the social prohibition on dissecting humans). I example of this comes from theGeneration of Animals in which Aristotle breaks open fertilized chicken eggs at carefully controlled intervals to discover when visible organs were generated. The start organ Aristotle saw was the heart. (In fact it is the spinal cord and the beginnings of the nervous system, simply this is not visible without employing mod staining techniques.) On eggs opened afterward, Aristotle saw other organs. This led Aristotle to come out against a pop theory of conception and evolution entitled, "the pre-formation theory." In the pre-formation theory, whose advocates extended until the eighteenth century, all the parts appear all at once and development is just the growth of these essential parts. The contrary theory that Aristotle espouses is the epigenetic theory. According to epigenesis, the parts are created in a nested hierarchical social club. Thus, through his observation, Aristotle saw that the heart was formed first, then he postulated that other parts were formed (besides backed-up past ascertainment). Aristotle concludes,

I mean, for case, non that the heart one time formed, fashions the liver, and then the liver fashions something else; merely that the 1 is formed after the other (just as man is formed in time after a child), non by it. The reason of this is that and so far as the things formed by nature or by human art are concerned, the germination of that which ispotentially brought about by that which is inauthenticity; so that the form of B would have to be contained in A, e.g., the form of liver would take to exist in the heart—which is cool. (GA 734a 28-35, Peck trans.)

In epigenesis the controlling process of evolution operates according to the TE plan of creating the most important parts get-go. Since the heart is the principle (arche) of the body, being the middle of blood production and awareness/intelligence, it is appropriate that it should be created showtime. And so other parts such as the liver, etc. are then created in their appropriate order. The epigenesis-preformation debate lasted two thousand years and Aristotle got information technology correct.

Another interesting observation by Aristotle is the discovery of the reproductive mode of the domestic dog shark,Mustelus laevis (HA 6.x, 565b 1ff.). This species is externally viviparous (live begetting) even so internally oviparous (egg bearing). Such an observation could only take come up from dissections and conscientious observations.

Some other ascertainment concerns the reproductive habits of cuttlefish. In this procedure of hectocotylization, the sperm of theArgonauta among other allied species comes in large spermataphores that the male transfers to the mantle crenel of the female. This complicated maneuver, described in HA 524a 4-5, 541b 9-fifteen, cf. 544a 12, GA 720b 33, was not fully verified by moderns until 1959!

Though Aristotle's observations on bees in HA seems to be entirely from the beekeeper's point of view (HA 625b7-22), he does note that there are three classes of bees and that sexual reproduction requires that i class give fashion. He begins his discussion in theGeneration of Animals with the post-obit remark, "The generation of bees is beset with many bug" (GA 759a 9). If at that place are three classes and ii genders, then something is amiss. Aristotle goes through what he feels to be all the possibilities. Though the observations are probably second-hand, Aristotle is withal able to evaluate the data. He employs his systematic theory using the over-riding meta-principle that Nature always acts in an orderly way (GA 760a 32) to class his explanation of the office of each type of bee. This means that in that location must be a purposeful process (TE) that guides generation. Nonetheless, since neither Aristotle nor the beekeepers had ever seen bee copulation, and since Aristotle allows for asexual generation in some fish, he believes that the case of bees offers him some other case in which one grade is sterile (complies with modern theory on worker bees), another course creates its own kind and some other (this is meant to represent to the Queen bee—that Aristotle calls a Male monarch Bee considering it has a stinger and females in nature never have defensive weapons), while the third grade creates not its own class but another (this is the drone).

Aristotle has got some of this right and some of it wrong. What he has right is starting time, bees are unusual in having three classes. Second, 1 class is infertile and works for the adept of the whole. Third, one class (the Queen) is a super-reproducer. All the same, in the case of bees it is Aristotle's method rather than his results that stirs admiration. Three meta-principles cause particular note:

  1. Reproduction works with two groups not three. The quickest "solution" would have been to brand 1 group sterile so brand the other two male and female. [This would take been the correct response.] However, since none of the beekeepers reported anything like reproductive behavior amongst bees and considering Aristotle's own express observations likewise do not note this, he is reluctant to make such a reply. It is on the footing of thephainomena that Aristotle rejects bee copulation (GA 759a 10).
  2. Aristotle holds thata priori argument alone is not plenty. One must square the nearly probable caption with the observed facts.
  3. Via illustration, Aristotle notes that some fish seem not to reproduce and even some flies are generated spontaneously. Thus, assigning the roles to the various classes that he does, Aristotle does not create a sui generis instance. Past illustration to other suppositions of his biological theory, Aristotle is able to "solve" a troublesome case via reference to illustration. (Aristotle is as well admirably cautious about his ain theory, saying that more work is needed.)

What is nearly important in Aristotle's accomplishments is his combination of keen observations with a critical scientific method that employs his systematic categories to solve issues in biology and then link these to other bug in human being life.

9. Determination

Since Aristotle's biological works incorporate almost a third of his writings that have come down to us, and since these writings may have occurred early in his career, information technology is very possible that the influence of the biological works upon Aristotle's other writings is considerable. Aristotle's biological works (then often neglected) should be brought to the fore, not but in the history of biology, but as well as a way of understanding some of Aristotle'due south not-biological writings.

ten. References and Further Reading

a. Primary Text

  • Bekker, Immanuel (ed) update past Olof Gigon ,Aristotelis Opera. Berlin, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1831-1870, rpt. W. de Gruyter, 1960-1987.

b. Central Texts in Translation

  • Barnes, Jonathan (ed).The Consummate Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Printing, 1984.
  • The Clarendon Series of Aristotle:
  • Balme, David (tr and ed). Updated by Allan Gotthelf,De Partibus Animalium I with De Generatione Animalium I (with passages from II ane-3). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
  • Lennox, James G. (tr and ed)Aristotle on the Parts of Animals I-four. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
  • The Loeb Series of Aristotle (contrary pages of Greek and English language).

c. Selected Secondary Sources

  • Balme, David. "Aristotle's Utilize of Differentiae in Zoology."Aristote et les Problèms de Méthode.Louvain: Publications Universitaires 1961.
  • Balme, David. "GENOS and EIDOS in Aristotle'southward Biology"The Classical Quarterly. 12 (1962): 81-88.
  • Balme, David. "Aristotle's Biology was not Essentialist"Archiv Für Geschichte der Philosophie. 62.ane (1980): i-12.
  • Bourgey, Louis.Observation et Experiénce chez Aristote. Paris: J. Vrin, 1955.
  • Boylan, Michael. "Machinery and Teleology in Aristotle'southward Biological science"Apeiron 15.2 (1981): 96-102.
  • Boylan, Michael. "The Digestive and 'Circulatory' Systems in Aristotle's Biology"Journal of the History of Biology 15.1 (1982): 89-118.
  • Boylan, Michael.Method and Practice in Aristotle'south Biology. Lanham, Dr. and London: University Press of America, 1983.
  • Boylan, Michael. "The Hippocratic and Galenic Challenges to Aristotle'south Conception Theory"Periodical of the History of Biology 15.ane (1984): 83-112.
  • Boylan, Michael. "The Identify of Nature in Aristotle's Biology"Apeiron nineteen.1 (1985).
  • Boylan, Michael. "Galen'south Formulation Theory"Journal of the History of Biological science xix.ane (1986): 44-77.
  • Boylan, Michael. "Monadic and SystemicTEleology" inModernistic Bug in Teleology ed. Nicholas Rescher (Washington, D.C.: Academy Press of America, 1986).
  • Charles, David.Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Oxford Academy Press, 2000.
  • Deverreux, Daniel and Pierre Pellegrin. Eds.Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote. Paris: Éditions du Eye National de la Recherche Scientifique,1990.
  • Düring, Ingemar.Aristotles De Partibus Animalium, Critical and Literary Commentary. Goeteborg, 1943, rpt. NY.: Garland, 1980.
  • Ferejohn, M.The Origins of Aristotelian Scientific discipline. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
  • Gotthelf, Allan and James G. Lennox, eds.Philosophical Bug in Aristotle's Biological science. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
  • Grene, Marjorie.A Portrait of Aristotle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
  • Joly, Robert. "La Charactérologie Antiquarian Jusqu' à Aristote.Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire40 (1962): 5-28.
  • Kullmann, Wolfgang.Wissenscaft und Methode: Interpretationen zur Aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974.
  • Kullmann, Wolfgang.Aristoteles und die moderne Wissenschaft Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1998.
  • Kullmann, Wolfgang. "Aristotles' wissenschaftliche Methode in seinen zoologischen Schriften" in Wörhle, G., ed.Geschichte der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften. Band 1 Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1999, pp. 103-123.
  • Kullmann, Wolfgang. "Zoologische Sammelwerk in der Antike" in Wörhle, Thousand., ed.Geschichte der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften. Band i Stuttgart: F. Steiner 1999, pp. 181-198.
  • Kung, Joan. "Some Aspects of Form in Aristotle's Biology"Nature and System 2 (1980): 67-xc.
  • Kung, Joan. "Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Tertiary Human being Argument"Phronesis 26 (1981): 207-247.
  • Le Blonde, Jean Marie.Aristote, Philosophie de la Vie. Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1945.
  • Lesher, James. "NOUS in the Parts of Animals." Phronesis eighteen (1973): 44-68.
  • Lennox, James. "Teleology, Chance, and Aristotle's Theory of Spontaneous Generation"Periodical of the History of Philosophy xx (1982): 219-232.
  • Lennox, James. "The Place of Flesh in Aristotle'due south Zoology"Philosophical Topics 25.1 (1999): 1-16.
  • Lennox, James.Aristotle'southward Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins of Life Sciences. NY: Cambridge Academy Press, 2001.
  • Lloyd, One thousand.E.R. "Right and Left in Greek Philosophy"Journal of Hellenic Studies. 82 (1962): 67-90.
  • Lloyd, One thousand.Due east.R.Polarity and Analogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
  • Lloyd, G.Eastward.R.Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
  • Lloyd, G.E.R. "Saving the Appearances"Classical Quarterly. n.due south. 28 (1978): 202-222.
  • Lloyd, G.Eastward.R.Magic, Reason, and Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
  • Lloyd, One thousand.East.R.The Revolutions of Wisdom. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987
  • Lloyd, G.E.R.Methods and Problems in Greek Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
  • Lloyd, G.E.R.Aristotelian Explorations. Cambridge: Cambridge Academy Press, 1996.
  • Louis, Pierre. "La Génération Spontanée chez Aristote"Congrèss International d'Histoire des Sciences (1968): 291-305.
  • Louis, Pierre.La Découverte de la Vie. Paris: Hermann, 1975.
  • Owen, G.E.L. "TITHENAI TA PHAINOMENA"Aristote et les Problèms de Méthode. Louvain, 1975.
  • Owen, G.E.Fifty.The Platonism of Aristotle. London: British Academy: Dawes Hicks Lecture on Philosophy, 1965.
  • Pellegrin, Pierre.La Classification des Animaux chez Aristote: Statut de la Biologie et Unite de l'Aristotélisme. Paris: Societé d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1982.
  • Pellegrin, Pierre. "Logical Difference and Biological Difference: The Unity of Aristotle'southward Idea" in Gotthelf, Allan and James G. Lennox, eds.Philosophical Problems in Aristotle's Biological science. NY: Cambridge University Printing, 1987, pp. 313-338.
  • Pellegrin, Pierre. "Taxonomie, moriologie, division" in Deverreux, Daniel and Pierre Pellegrin. Eds.Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote. Paris, 1990, 37-48.
  • Preus, Anthony. "Aristotle'south Parts of Animals 2.sixteen 659b 13-19: Is it Authentic?"Classical Quarterly18.two (1968): 170-178.
  • Preus, Anthony. "Nature Uses. . . ."Apeiron 3.ii (1969): 20-33.
  • Preus, Anthony.Science and Philosophy in Aristotle'due south Biological Works. NY: Olhms, 1975.
  • Preus, Anthony. "Eidos as Norm"Nature and System 1 (1979): 79-103.
  • Solmsen, Friedrich.Aristotle'south System of the Physical Earth: A Comparison with his Predecessors.Ithaca, NY: Cornell Academy Press, 1960.
  • Sorabji, Richard.Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Academy Press, 1980.
  • Thompson, D'Arcy.Aristotle every bit Biologist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913.
  • Thompson, D'Arcy.Growth and Grade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917.
  • Ulmer, K.Wahrheit, Kunst und Natur bei Aristotles. Tübingen: M. Niemayer, 1953.
  • Witt, Charlotte.Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Estimation of Metaphysics Vii-IX.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Printing, 1989.
  • Wörhle, Georg and Jochen Althoff, eds.Biologie inGeschichte der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften (series). Band i Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1999.

Writer Information

Michael Boylan
Email: michael.boylan@marymount.edu
Marymount Academy
U. Due south. A.